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leads in this development and really it is up to us to make sure
that we get a broad enough understanding to maintain the
support for this technology, to move it ahead with responsibility.
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Knowledge is power. Never has that been truer than in
today's information age, with the exponential increase in
human knowledge, with our ever more powerful computing
devices, and with our extraordinary means of communication.
"Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth," said
Archimedes. Today we know that the place to stand is at the
console of a supercomputer.
The other side ofthe coin, and there are always two sides, is
to be found in Ecclesiastes; "He that increaseth knowledge,
increaseth sorrow." The author of Ecclesiastes was not simply
being morose or jaundiced. He knew that with increased
knowledge inevitably comes increased responsibility, for
good or for evil; together with the increased burden of decision; the wider potential for error; and the need for new
ethical guidelines to define the boundaries of action in the
new domain, wrested from the realm of innocence and ignorance.
Today we are at the verge of a most extraordinary advance in
human knowledge, in the domain of the life sciences. We are
about to achieve no less than a complete knowledge and
understanding of the nature of life and the plan of evolutionand thereby of ourselves-as a part of life, a product of evolution.
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The science of biology, in its continuing analysis of the
processes oflife, has penetrated to life's innermost secret-to
the genes, to DNA, to the master programs that define the
nature of each living cell and each living organism.
The genetic programs are carried on the chromosomes in
the structure of very long DNA molecules. The DNA molecules
are the well-known double helixes composed of a ladder of
nucleotide pairs. There are four kinds of pairs and their
sequence conveys the hereditary information. A gene is a tract
of several hundred or several thousand such pairs and is
located in a particular region on a particular chromosome.
We have already determined the complete genetic structure, the DNA sequence, of a few very simple organisms (up to
170,000 nucleotide pairs), and we now have the capacity and
are setting out to determine the complete genetic structure of
higher organisms and specifically, of man. A project is now
being launched to sequence the entire human genome, some
3 billion nucleotide pairs of DNA. It can surely be done. It is
only a matter of time and efficient approach (1).
This knowledge would permit a complete enumeration of
the genetic ingredients of man. We estimate there are 100300,000 genes in Homo sapiens. These will now be defined
and enumerated.
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I think this is a historic event comparable in significance to
the formulation of the periodic table by Mendeleev. The
periodic table not only ordered the elements in a rational
manner, it also permitted us to say that this is the complete
roster. There are no more. All objects on earth are made out of
just 92 elements, in varied combination.
We are, of course, still exploring unusual properties of
novel combinations of these elements, as in the superconducting ceramics discovered recently.
Similarly, we will, before too long, be able to say this roster
is the complete list of human genes, or, similarly, the complete list of chimpanzee genes, or mouse genes, or mosquito
genes. This is what it takes to make a man, or a mouse, or a
mosquito. No more, no less.
But even more will emerge from this knowledge. The
process of evolution and the progressive emergence of the
panoply of organisms on earth has involved successive
changes and divergence of genes, and particularly, of the
genes that determine the patterns of developmental growth
that lead to each organismic form. The old and partially true
epigram, "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny," recognized
that the developmental stages of the more recently evolved
life forms incorporate discernible elements of the developmental stages of older forms.
Knowledge of the genetic bases of the evolution of these
developmental patterns will enable us to classify them, to see
how older patterns were modified and adapted to create new
patterns, which, in turn, afforded new potentials for modification and evolution. It is likely that we will be able to define a
set of general patterns on which nature has worked innumerable variations to create the world of life.
As knowledge, as intellectual achievement, this is a splendid prospect; exciting, even thrilling. But as we have repeatedly seen, such knowledge brings responsibility for its use.
What uses may we envision and what dilemmas will they
pose?
The potentials for the use of this knowledge seem limited
only by the range of our imagination. Consider what already in
a few short years has been accomplished or is in process (2):

Microorganisms that produce insulin or human growth
hormone, or blood clotting factors that produce Vitamin C
and by a new pathway that can protect plants against frost
Microorganisms that make proteins for use as vaccines for
viral disease, or novel synthetic antibodies to fight viral
infection
Plants that are more resistant to herbicides, plants that are
toxic to their usual insect predators, plants of higher human
nutritive value
Plants more resistant to drought, or high salinity, or disease
Farm animals that grow faster and larger and more effi ciently and are more resistant to disease
Tests for genetic defect in humans for the mutations that
lead to Huntington's Disease, or Gaucher's Disease or retinoblastoma
Incipiently, efforts to develop genetic therapies for some of
the more than 2,500 known genetic disorders that afflict
humans (3)
And these developments, all now in laboratory or production phase, are but the leading edge of the new biotechnology. In one sense, this new advance is even more powerful
than that of Mendeleev, for we can not only invent and explore
new combinations of genes, as we can with chemical elements , but we can also invent wholly new genes never before
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seen to produce new molecules with novel, desired properties.
And so looking ahead we can foresee other technologies;
e.g., protein engineering-the design of protein molecules
that catalyze reactions unknown in nature or under conditions
of temperature or pH or solvent unfamiliar to living cells ( 4).
Most of the chemical processes that underly life are very old
in the evolutionary sense. Nature long ago devised the basic
protein structures that efficiently carry out these processes.
More recently invented biological processes frequently use
protein catalysts derived by genetic mutation or rearrangement from the older forms . As one result, we can see clear
relationships between the protein molecules that react with
oxygen or detect light in the most primitive organisms and the
more advanced forms . And, for instance, molecules that act as
hormones in insects are used with some modification for
other hormonal processes in mammals (5).
But the potential number of varieties of protein molecules,
composed as they are of several hundred amino acids of 20
different kinds, is literally astronomical. Only a minute fraction can ever have been tried, even in the whole course of
evolution. And so the potential for the design of genes for, and
the synthesis of, proteins with specific novel properties would
seem almost unlimited.
On another scale of organization, the basic plans of living
organisms, their structural and functional characters, have
evolved by mutation and by rearrangements not yet well
understood from those of the simpler forms-the worms and
insects and echinoderms-to those of the more complexthe fish, the reptiles, the birds and mammals. And, analogously, from the simpler to the more complex plants.
But again, there is little reason to believe that nature has
explored the whole potential range of life forms. The forms
nature has created had to evolve by small steps from previous
forms, and had always to survive in the biosphere then extant.
The forms with which we interact in a major way-the agricultural plants and animals, the fish and the forests, our pets-are
those that nature evolved and which we have adapted with
minor modifications from the wild forms.
But there would seem to be no reason why, with sufficient
understanding, we could not, for instance, evolve plants more
suited to our needs that may look nothing like wheat or corn
or rice, or that may grow under conditions unsuited to current
crops. Perhaps one might call this species engineering.
But again, we have learned that the introduction of such
profound technological change is never simple. That major
innovations strain the resilience of our social institutions as
these struggle to cope and adapt, as well as the resilience of
the biosphere on which we all depend. That one must expect,
and prepare for, accompanying economic and cultural upheavals, and even for deep moral and ethical dilemmas as our
powers increase.
What are the public concerns? More systematically and very
broadly, these issues, these problems can be subsumed into
four general categories of concern:
1. The concern of providing for equity, for social justice, while
at the same time providing the possibility of change and
innovation.
2. The concern that we may, inadvertently, do ourselves some
irreversible harm. Confronting irreversible processes is
always a difficult task for mortal beings.
3. Concerns relating to resolving the dilemmas of partial
knowledge, again a perennial task for Homo sapiens.
4. lastly, more inchoate but deeply felt, a concern for hubris,
for the need to recognize our human limitations.
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Concern for Equity
Social and economic issues are already nigh upon us in
various areas.
The prospect of more abundant, more nutritio~s crops: of
cattle that produce more milk, of more disease-resistant swme
and chickens, is, of course, pleasing. But in our era of agricultural overabundance, the prospect of yet more brings with it
the prospect of yet more economic and social upheaval; of
fewer farms and farmers ; of the survival of the larger farms
better able to incorporate the new technology ( 6). Of course,
new alternative jobs would be simultaneously created in the
biotechnology industry, but the economic dislocations are
evident and potentially immediate.
These problems are not unique to biotechnology. But we
are now more aware that developments that may be of great
overall societal benefit may impose significant cost upon
some individuals, and we increasingly recognize that they
should not have to bear that cost alone.
Questions already arise as to the ownership of the products
and the profits of the new technology. Courts have already
authorized patents for microorganisms and plants. In a logical
extrapolation, more than a dozen applications to patent animals have been filed with the patent office (7). Can a line be
drawn should a line be drawn , as to what can be patented,
what ~an be privatized? What are the consequences of "validating new areas of the natural world a.s private property?", to
use Martin Kenney's phrase (8).
Most of the fundamental research that underlies the burgeoning biotechnology was funded by the federal govern·
ment in our universities and medical schools. How then
should the financial rewards of this multi-year investment be
distributed?
The impact ofthe abrupt emergence ofbiotechnology from
the academic laboratory to the industrial plant has brought
new associations and new possibilities to the university,
which have strained its traditional social relationships. Concerns over the private use of public facilities, over the introduction of industrial secrecy into academic discussion, over
the reorientation of research objectives to profit-making goals,
have been hotly, if inconclusively, debated.
More broadly, and reflective of the scope and scale and
potential of this technology, and these attendant concerns,
one may ask, to quote again Mr. Kenney, "should the enor·
mous power of transforming life forms be transferred to
groups merely seeking a return on an investment?"

Concerns about Irreversible Harm
Human beings, at least those who reach maturity, know
they are fallible . And thus, we have a hard time dealing with
issues of irreversible processes. Witness our intense concern
over such matters as the death penalty, or over the adequate
education of our children, or more mundanely, over the loss
of topsoil. Mistakes in such matters can never be undone.
Biotechnology, more than other technologies, similarly
raises the issues and concerns of irreversible processes. If we
introduce a new chemical into the biosphere, for instance, the
chlorofluorocarbons, and it proves to have unfortunate, unanticipated consequences, as in the thinning of the ozone layer,
we can cease its production. And in time, hopefully in ade.
quate time, it will be degraded and disappear.
But a living organism is by definition self-reproducmg.
Many of the proposed applications of the biotechnology
require that the new organisms be taken out ofthe laboratory
and applied in the field. If these organisms thus released find a
suitable ecological niche, reproduce and spread, they are,
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manifestly, beyond recall. Should they prove a potential
hazard, we have a problem.
Opinions differ widely as to our ability to ~redi~t the o~t
come of such introductions. The molecular b10logtsts are, m
general, much more sanguine than the ecologic~! fraternity
(9) . Molecular biologists argue that most genetiC changes,
most mutations, are deleterious to the well balanced, well
adapted genomes that nature has evolved. Most introduced
forms will therefore be at a disadvantage in nature, and presumably, therefore only maintained by purposeful human
intervention. They argue that pathogenicity to man or to other
plants or animals is a complex property not likely to be
engendered by a few genetic modifications. And ~hey argue
that many of these modifications must have been tned already
by nature in the course of evolution, but failed to survive.
Ecologists are much less confident (10, 11). They are concerned with the complex, often delicate ecological balances
in nature. Microorganisms, plants, and animals each play
essential roles in the maintenance of the biosphere. Ecologists cite examples of the devastation wrought by the introduction of alien species into an apt environment, such as the
gypsy moth, or the kudzu grass. They also cite instances
wherein single gene mutations have markedly broadened the
host range of undesired organisms as in the spread of cheatgrass to rangelands, or the apple maggot, which was originally
restricted to the Hawthorne.
In general, ecologists are not persuaded by the molecular
biologists' argument of optimal adaptation. They propose that
species are individualistic, not part of a tightly woven ne.twork.
To quote Philip Regal, "organisms are adequately, not tdeally
constructed for survival" (12).
Ecologists are more aware of the complexity of the problem. In a study of the consequences of the 913 species in~ro
duced into California, 788, that is 86%, caused no ecologtcal
damage. More than 23 species, 2.5%, however, had major
ecological impacts.
. .
To quote Professor Wingard, "Ecology lacks general pnnctples, grand theory, and laws that would enable us t~ make any
predictions or deduce, a priori, any degree ~f certamty, ab~~t
what the impact of any introduced speCies, whether tt s
recombinant or not, would be in the environment" (12).
Clearly there is a dilemma here: the problem ofthe indefinably small risk of an indefinably large catastrophe. One
approach to this issue is to be cautious, to analyze each such
introduction on a case-by-case basis, and gradually to accumulate sufficient case history to permit widening generalizations.
With some exceptions, this is the general practice.
Elsewhere, I suggested an alternative procedure, which
would be deliberately to build into all novel organisms a
susceptibility to some, unnatural, chemical or physical agent,
so that a new form could be controlled if it turned out to have
undesirable properties. ln short, a mechanism similar to the
abort devices we build into our rockets. This suggestion has
not met with great acclaim, however.
One must point out here that, of course, evolution and
natural selection have not stopped. We are proposing greatly
to accelerate these processes in selected domains. But the
organisms we generate and release into the en:ironment w~ll
then be subject to their own evolution over ttme. They wtll
foll ow their own genetic destiny.

Concerns about Partial Knowledge
As human beings, we are continually obliged to make
decisions, to act upon the basis of partial knowledge, and to
improvise partial solutions, which often give rise to severe
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

issues of policy and ethics.
Nowhere is this more evident than in medicine. We
invented the costly technology of iron lungs and associated
care facilities, now obsolete, to help polio victims because we
did not know how to produce a vaccine.
Currently, we have a costly network of treatment centers to
provide kidney dialysis because we do not know how to repair
damaged kidneys. This technological advance has created the
problem of provision of the resources for this continuing,
life-essential process, which is often beyond the means of
many individuals. In a rich country such as the United States,
the government assumes this responsibility, but not all countries have this capability.
Because we do not yet know how to repair damaged organs,
we have developed techniques of organ transplant with a
considerable degree of success. But there is a shortage of
organs to transplant and the cost is very high, which raises
ethical dilemmas-who shall be the recipients and who shall
pay?
A5 biological knowledge advances, step by step, similar
dilemmas of partial knowledge inevitably arise. We have, in
recent years, greatly expanded our understanding of the
genetic basis of many human disorders, and our ability to
detect the presence, at the gene level, of genetic defect,
without, at the same time, having any ability to remedy such a
defect.
What shall we do with this expanded capability of genetic
foreknowledge? At present, our capabilities are limited to the
simple genetic disorders: Huntington's Disease, Gaucher's
Disease, sickle cell anemia. Does the child with Huntington's
gene want to know that at age 40 he or she will begin to
degenerate rapidly? Perhaps not, but then such knowledge
might influence his or her reproductive decisions.
If someone is found to be a carrier of Gaucher's Disease,
should their kin, also potential carriers, be tested or be notified? Should in time each of us have a genetic pedigree?
As our knowledge progresses, so will our ability to anticipate the more complex genetic disorders; the tendencies to
diabetes, heart disease, schizophrenia, even the behavioral
traits such as Alzheimer's disease, the tendency to manic
depression or to alcoholism, or susceptibility to drug addiction.
And Jagging behind, but sure to follow in time, will be
potential therapies for these genetic conditions. Given their
social and economic costs, there will be great pressure for the
application of such therapies. And therewith arises the spectre
of human genetic engineering, and the social determination
of genetically desirable-or undesirable-traits.
Current policy would restrict genetic therapy to the somatic
level for the treatment of the affected individual, and proscribe intervention in the human germ line (13). Whether such
a policy will be sustainable when the potential for intervention is real, not merely hypothetical, remains to be seen. It is
not hard to envision the commercial applications, the international genetic rivalries, etc.

Concern for Hubris
And last, hubris. To the Greeks, hubris characterized those
actions of man when he tried to set himself among the Gods.
Today we would characterize hubris differently, as the failure
to recognize human fallibility; the willful neglect of the limits
of human knowledge, however rapidly expanding; the blindness to our growing ability to do ourselves mortal harm as it
parallels our growing ability to accomplish great goods.
Some deride the very concept of hubris as one of faint heart.
Volume 53 , Number 1, 1987/ 88

Others feel that the concept has innate human wisdom. We
know to our cost the unhappy ends to which other great
advances of knowledge have been put by human failings .
The universality of the genetic structures and the code, the
underlying similarity of the basic genetic and enzymatic processes in all living organisms, indicate clearly that all extant
life forms derive from a common origin. And thus, that all the
other living organisms on the planet are, just as we, the current
products of 3 billion years of evolution. Do we have the right
to displace these, to replace them with products of human
ingenuity? To make all the flora and fauna a human construct?
And are we smart enough? Nature has evolved this remarkably self-sustaining, seemingly endlessly inventive biosphere,
resilient, adaptive to the temporal variations of climate or
volcanic activity, or even asteroid encounter. Can we do as
well?
We can undoubtedly acquire the knowledge to direct our
own genetic destiny, but do we have the wisdom to effect such
an undertaking to ends that are both sustainable and just?
Biotechnology, this extraordinary accomplishment, by
greatly extending the domain of human power, correspondingly extends the scope of human responsibility. It thereby
generates a need for new ethical principles to guide our
conduct in this new world.
Our varied human societies, culturally diverse, technically
diverse, morally diverse, are but beginning to seek to cope
with these issues.
Accepted ethics are usually the result of the gradual accretion of experience and wisdom in the conduct of human
affairs. But it is clear that the simple extension of accepted
ethics into this new domain will not be sufficient. What is not
clear is whether the evolution of appropriate ethical principles can keep pace with the evolution of the technology.
Human invention began slowly, back in pre-history with the
use of fire and such remarkable creations as agriculture, the
wheel, writing, and the alphabet. But, while cumulative, these
were isolated events, separate in space and time.
It was not until the late Renaissance, in the 16th and 17th
centuries, that the idea arose of sustained exploration of
Nature as in Frances Bacon's "House of Solomon"; the idea
that mankind could, by continued discovery, come to understand the world about us and then use that understanding,
consciously, to shape the world to human needs and desires.
It is amusing to realize that the entire staff of Bacon's
proposed research facility was to be 33 persons. One of the
major discoveries of this century has been that of the scale of
scientific enterprise necessary, in many fields, to produce
knowledge at a rate commensurate with the complexity oft he
phenomena observed. Today, around the planet, literally millions of scientists are exploring Nature, and with tools of
ever-increasing power and sophistication.
And thus it is, in our time, that we are coming to understand
that we need to use this great fund of knowledge with a
corresponding degree of wisdom. And that this task -of selection, of the design of channels to guide the uses of our new
pro found knowledge of matter and life-is one of magnitude
quite comparable to that needed to acquire this knowledge.
We need to devise institutions, at the highest level, that can
view these prospective innovations coherently in the broadest
perspective. If we do not, then the social strains and the fears
and stresses they engender may well ensnare us in a rigid net
of regulation and process and deny us the great opportunities
our discoveries offer.
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